This chapter develops empirical measures of the economic incentives for deferred retirement among older workers. Using a new data file on pay and pensions, we construct intertemporal budget sets reflecting income available to workers at alternative retirement ages. The analysis explores how continued labor force attachment is rewarded in terms o f net earn ings, Social Security benefits, and private pension income.
Two motivations guide the research. First, it is important to understand how workers' income opportunities change with age. Studies o f retire ment patterns, including our own and others', 1 have demonstrated that these economic rewards influence the choice o f retirement age. Savings decisions, consumption paths, and other economic outcomes are also re sponsive to the budget set at older ages. Unfortunately, data limitations have made it difficult for previous authors to explore the range o f income opportunities available to older individuals. This paper presents and dis cusses new empirical evidence on how older workers' income opportuni ties change as the workers age.
Olivia S. Mitchell is a faculty research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Re search and associate professor of labor economics at Cornell University. Gary S. Fields is professor of economics and labor economics at Cornell University. Both authors are equally responsible for the contents of this paper; first mention is determined randomly.
The authors wish to thank Joseph Quinn for helpful comments, Vivian Fields for careful computer programming, and Rebecca Luzadis for capable research assistance. Research support was received from the U.S. Department of Labor, Cornell University, and the Na tional Bureau of Economic Research. The research reported here is part of the NBER's re search program in labor studies and pensions. Any opinions expressed are those of the au thors.
1. Mitchell and Fields 1984; Fields and Mitchell 1984; Boskin and Hurd 1978; Burkhauser and Quinn 1983; Burtless and Hausman 1982; Gordon and Blinder 1980; Gustman and Steinmeier 1984. 269 Exploring how companies differ in the compensation packages they of fer to older workers is important as well. Some authors, e.g., Lazear (1982) , have suggested that firms use their pension plans to encourage ear ly retirement, though data on this phenomenon are difficult to obtain. The present chapter develops a detailed description o f private pension structures and the ways in which they treat prolonged job attachment.
Two main conclusions arise from the analysis. First, the data show that total net income rises as people defer retirement, but the size o f the income increment varies with age. Second, the data show that some pension plans encourage early retirement among older workers but others penalize it. Thus differences in private pension structures prove to be an important source of variation in income opportunities among older workers. Our re sults have implications for researchers interested in older workers' income patterns and for policymakers who propose mandating actuarial neutral ity in private pension plans. Section 9.1 o f this chapter reviews briefly the most important theoreti cal features o f older workers' income opportunities and discusses some general considerations when building an empirical counterpart o f the theoretical budget set. Section 9.2 presents our methodology and data, and section 9.3 presents the findings. Conclusions are collected in section 9.4.
Theoretical Considerations
We consider the rewards for continued work in the context o f older per sons' retirement decisions. Previous theoretical studies o f retirement be havior have identified the individual's problem as selecting the optimal amount o f work to do over the remaining lifetime, subject to income and time constraints.2 Optimal is defined as the labor supply path that maxi mizes intertemporal utility; accordingly, the goal is to select the retirement age that provides a worker with his most preferred combination o f leisure time and income from among available options. The worker's income constraints are determined by net earnings available from market work, and net Social Security and private pension benefits available during re tirement. His time constraint consists o f time remaining until death; this time may be allocated between work and leisure.3
More formally, the worker is postulated to select the retirement-age (/?) that maximizes intertemporal utility, the arguments o f which are lifetime consumption (C) and lifetime leisure (RET):
2. For a review of studies of retirement behavior, see Mitchell and Fields 1982. 3. We abstract here from retirement options involving part-time work or gradual with drawal from the labor force; Gustman and Steinmeier 1984 and Burtless and Moffitt 1982 consider these alternatives in some detail. For the sample of older workers described below, retirement may be best described as accepting the pension and leaving the firm since only a tiny minority ever worked after becoming pensioners. 
SS, = f(R ,t,F ), PP, = g(R,t,F).
When the worker defers retirement, many firms raise annual pension benefits to acknowledge the shorter period over which benefits will be paid; when benefits are only sufficiently larger to offset increased mortal ity, the pension structure is termed actuarially neutral.4 As with private pension formulas, Social Security rules also provide a positive credit as R
4.
In the empirical analysis below, we focus on defined benefit plans, i.e., those in which benefit amounts are functions of years of service and/or pay rather than pension contribu tions. Benefits in such plans need not be actuarially neutral. 
RET = N -R.
Understanding the income-leisure trade-off facing older workers is fa cilitated by figure 9.1. This figure graphs the present value o f income available to the older individual and the expected retirement period for all possible retirement ages; the diagram indicates that, for this hypothetical worker at least, his income is lowest if he chooses to retire as early as pos sible, while his income would rise substantially if he remained with the firm additional years. The figure presumes that deferring retirement is re warded by even more income; below we show empirically that the inter temporal budget set in fact has such a shape.
5.
Remaining lifetime may, of course, vary with health. The empirical work below uses standard life expectancies in computing the average value of future income streams; howev er, annuities are worth less to those with shorter remaining lifespans due to poor health, and benefits to such retirees should be adjusted accordingly.
Presenting the older worker's decision in this way highlights the similar ities between this model and the conventional labor economics approach to the hours-of-work decision. Figure 9 .1 also indicates that the optimal retirement date (R *) is determined in a familiar way: R* is the age at which the marginal utility o f an additional increment to lifetime income is just offset by the loss in utility from leisure foregone. While we do not develop comparative dynamics for R* here, they may be derived in much the same manner as in the cross-sectional framework (Fields and Mitchell 1984).
Some features o f the intertemporal budget set should be underscored. First, the older worker's budget set is defined over all possible retirement dates rather than at just one moment in time. A complete understanding o f the rewards for continued work therefore requires that one investigate not only one or two points on the budget surface, but all alternatives. Sec ond, to be able to compute PD V Y at each age, one must understand the private pension and Social Security benefit formulas facing a given work er, since these institutional rules impart structure to the intertemporal budget set. Third, the income-leisure trade-off embodies expectations about future income streams and formulas, inflation rates, mortality rates, and a host o f other variables. These must also be modeled in empiri cal work.
Building the Empirical Intertemporal Budget Set
To construct an intertemporal budget set, we require complete data on each worker's earnings, private pension benefits, and Social Security benefits. The data set used in the present empirical analysis is a subsample of the Benefit Amounts Survey ( 
6.
A data appendix describing empirical computations in more detail is available from the authors on request.
For the analysis at hand, we must know the rules determining pension benefits. We constructed such information from union contracts and summary plan descriptions on file with the U.S. Department o f Labor for fourteen defined benefit plans. No larger data set with information on both pensions and their beneficiaries is now available; the present analysis thus extends our own previous efforts as well as those o f other analysts who have generally been limited to an examination o f a single pension plan.7 On the other hand, our sample o f pension plans is still small enough that findings reported here must be viewed as exploratory rather than re presentative o f pension plans as a whole.
The plans represented here cannot be identified individually for confi dentiality reasons. We may say, though, that our sample includes several blue collar plans negotiated with the United Auto Workers, several other plans in the manufacturing sector, a craft union plan, and one in the trade sector.
An example o f the benefit rules used in one o f the United Auto Workers plans is given in table 9.1. Even this apparently simple years-of-service formula turns out to be quite complex in practice.
The formula given in table 9.1 describes pension benefit rules in effect around 1970, at which time our sample workers were about sixty years o f age. But the rules in 1970 would not necessarily have been appropriate for a worker who waited to retire until, say, 1975. In this company, and in the other companies in our study, the pension formulas were incremented sev eral times during the 1960s. In evaluating what future retirement benefits would have been, workers in that company might reasonably have expect ed that benefits would rise in the future as much as they had in the past. Therefore we looked at prior union contracts, the Bureau o f Labor Statis tics Pension Digest, and other documents to determine what had occurred prior to 1970. Empirical analysis o f changes in pension benefits over time for newly retiring workers, as well as for previously retired individuals, re vealed that pension plans typically raised benefits in line with inflation for workers not yet retired, but held nominal benefits constant for those al ready retired. Therefore, the empirical model assumes that a prospective retiree would have expected nominal preretirement increases just short o f the inflation rate, but probably zero postretirement increases.
The specific pension formula outlined in table 9.1 depends only on age and years o f service. To compute pension amounts in plans where earn ings are also used in the benefit formulas, it is necessary to know what a worker would have earned had he remained on his job. Earnings informa tion is also needed, o f course, in constructing the total lifetime income available from alternative retirement strategies.
7.
See, for instance, the work of Burkhauser 1979 and Fields and Mitchell 1984 on the United Auto Workers, and Burtless and Hausman 1982 on federal government workers.
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Rewards for Continued Work N ote: The pension structure in company X is negotiated every three years and written into a contract with the United Automobile Workers union (UAW). The plan is noncon tributory. The benefit formula negotiated in the early 1970s, when the sample workers were about sixty years of age and were presumably deciding when to retire, varied depending on age and/or years of service. One limitation o f the Social Security computation should be noted. It is possible to estimate only the male's Social Security benefits, but not his spouse's benefits, since marital status information is not reliably reported in our file.
Information on earnings is available from the BAS-Social
In moving from the annual budget set components (all o f which are in nominal dollars) to present discounted values (which are much more in formative if expressed in real dollars), several additional assumptions must be made. Standard practice is followed by discounting each year's benefits by the probability o f mortality at each age, based on survival rate information for the cohort in question. In addition, future benefits are deflated by two factors-inflation and a real discount rate. Estimated fu ture benefit streams assume continuation o f the rate o f price increases prevailing in the early 1970s; to discount benefits accruing in the future, the same nominal rate is used. In addition, a 2 percent real discount rate is used to reflect time preference. Confirmatory analysis with other discount rates produces results virtually identical to those reported below.
The foregoing describes the construction o f the budget set in the BAS file. In the balance o f the chapter we summarize this information by cal culating the overall budget set and its components for a specific "illustra tive worker."8 We do this for purposes o f comparison, since it is useful to derive benefits using the same basic earnings and job tenure characteris tics, while holding constant other factors that might vary across plans. Nonetheless, this illustrative individual should be relatively similar to ac tual workers in the pension plan, since benefit structures are generally constructed with a relevant salary range in mind. The illustrative worker discussed below is assigned the mean net earnings and job tenure derived from the underlying sample described above. 
The Economic Rewards for Deferring Retirement
As discussed earlier, two empirical questions guide our empirical explo rations: (1) How do total income profiles change as workers age? and (2) How do pension plans reward continued work effort? Each question is in vestigated in turn in this section.9 Table 9 .2 displays the elements o f the illustrative worker's intertem poral budget set, expressed in annual terms in the top panel and in present discounted value terms in the lower panel.10 Expected income amounts are reported only until age sixty-five in this relatively aggregative table, since some firms prohibited employment after that age; disaggregated figures 8. Readers of our earlier work should be alerted to the fact that those papers use actual workers in a company, not the illustrative worker used here.
The Shape o f the Total Income Path (PDVY)
9. The calculations in this section assume that the illustrative worker is single. Alterna tive calculations assuming that he is married yield identical qualitative conclusions, except for one point noted below.
10. All present discounted value figures are reported in 1970 dollars. Approximations are possible using the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey; see Fields and Mitchell 1984. shows that annual (first-year) benefits from private pensions are sizeable, equaling or exceeding the single worker's Social Security payments for all ages but sixty-five, where they are only slightly less.12 Net private pension benefits amount to one-quarter to one-third of after-tax earnings for indi viduals in the sample.13
Still focusing on annual benefits, line A .3 indicates large differences in benefits depending on when the worker retires. On average, an age-sixty retiree would have received private pension income o f about $2,200 in the year he retired. If he deferred retirement by one year, the addition to (nominal) benefits would be on the order o f 7 percent. However, the mar ginal pension payoff to an additional year's work is by no means uniform across retirement ages; for example, benefits at age sixty-two are lower than for age sixty-one. This benefit decline is attributable to pension plan supplements provided until a retiree attains age sixty-two, the age o f eligi bility for Social Security. A reduction is again evident between the ages of sixty-four and sixty-five; the pension rules thus acknowledge that workers can file for full Social Security retirement income at age sixty-five and pro vide a bridge for individuals retiring earlier. In general, the marginal pen sion payoff to retiring one year later varies a lot across retirement ages, a fact not immediately evident from a cursory review o f benefit rules. Line B.3 o f table 9.2 converts the annual pension benefit figures into present discounted values in real dollars. Again it is evident that the re ward structure built into private pensions varies for different retirement ages. The illustrative worker would receive more in lifetime benefits if he left th^ firm at age sixty than if he postponed retirement to age sixty-one, despite the fact that annual benefits are higher at age sixty-one than at sixty. In fact, the annual pension benefits are increased at less than actuarially neutral rates at several ages, as is evident from computed changes in the present values o f lifetime benefits: 12. For a married worker, the sum of the worker's plus spouse's Social Security benefits exceeds private pension benefits.
13. Previous studies have not computed after-tax replacement rates both for private pen sions and Social Security, so these figures cannot be directly compared with others in the lit erature. We find that the overall replacement rate including both pensions and a single retir ee's Social Security benefit is between 50 and 60 percent on average, though in some cases individuals received as much as 95 percent of preretirement net earnings. Replacement rates would be higher if spouse benefits were included.
Present values in table 9.2 are averages across fourteen pension plans, so they conceal potentially interesting differences in company pension structures. Table 9 .3 splits the sample into two groups: pattern and con ventional plans. Pattern plans are pensions where benefits are based al most exclusively on years o f service with the firm (or occupation, if a craft union). Conventional plans, more common among nonunion firms, de termine benefits based both on final salary and tenure with the firm.
It is evident from table 9.3 that the overall means obscure some key dif ferences between the two kinds o f benefit structures. Pattern plans tend to structure their first-year benefits so that they rise more or less smoothly, reaching a peak at age sixty-four; annual benefits typically fall for work ers deferring benefits beyond that point. First-year benefits in conven tional plans operate differently; in this case, benefits for the age-sixty-two retiree are lower than for the worker leaving one year earlier. It is this sub group o f plans that produces the dip in annual benefits found in the over all mean. However, after age sixty-two, conventional plans tend to pro vide ever-increasing benefit amounts for workers postponing retirement up to age sixty-five.
An examination o f discounted pension values in these two types of plans suggests even sharper contrasts. Pattern plans (line B.2) actively dis courage work beyond age sixty.14 An employee in a pattern plan who de fers retirement until age sixty-five will in fact receive lifetime benefits that are about 18 percent lower than he would have received had he retired at age sixty! On the other hand, present value streams in conventional plans are structured so that a worker deferring retirement until age sixty-five re ceives about 17 percent higher benefits than if he retired at age sixty. Thus between ages sixty and sixty-five, conventional pension plans appear to improve benefits by about the same amount that pattern plans reduce them.
Clearly 
+ 0%
Evidently, pattern plans actively encourage early retirement, whereas con ventional plans strongly encourage work up to age sixty-two. After age 14. This is similar to the finding reported by Lazear 1982. sixty-two, conventional plans provide a flat payoff schedule for addition al years o f work; in pattern plans, the slope becomes strongly negative (see figure 9 .2). Table 9 .4 disaggregates to the level o f the individual plan. This break down o f pension plan benefit structures reveals even more variability in economic rewards for continued work. These plan-specific data permit the computation o f benefit streams for ages beyond sixty-five in cases where continued work was permitted; firms with mandatory retirement are indicated with a dash.
This disaggregative investigation o f pension plan rules suggests two conclusions:
1. Pension plans reward deferred retirement differently from one com pany to the next. Pattern plans as a whole, and the UAW plans in particu lar, encourage early retirement by structuring benefits so that they attain a maximum between ages sixty and sixty-two. Conventional plans are more complex, but as a rule structure their benefit flows to reward continued work well beyond age sixty.
2. Marginal payoffs to deferred retirement are uneven; actuarial neu trality across retirement ages is rare. In our sample, a worker deferring re tirement by one year could have increased his lifetime pension income flow by as much as 14 percent, or reduced it by 5 percent, depending on the pension plan in which he worked.
In overview, then, some private pensions reward prolonged work and oth ers penalize it, both in overall and marginal terms. It is not true that pen sions always discourage work beyond age sixty. 
Conclusion
The notion o f an intertemporal budget set facing older workers flows from an economic model of choice o f retirement age subject to income and time constraints. Measuring the budget set empirically requires that total discounted income be computed for each possible retirement age. In so doing, it is important to model Social Security and private pension rules defining benefits available at each age, and in addition to determine how workers would have expected these rules to change in the future.
Using a unique new data set known as the Benefit Amounts Survey, we develop empirical answers to two questions: (1) How do workers' total in comes change as they defer retirement? and (2) Do private pension struc tures reward or penalize continued work at older ages?
The data suggest two important features o f the discounted total income streams (PD VY) facing older workers, which have not been noted in pre vious studies. First, PD VY rises monotonically as retirement is deferred. The patterns just noted have implications for both researchers and poli cymakers. Analysts interested in modeling and estimating the determi nants o f retirement, savings, and other economic behavior among older workers must build and examine the intertemporal budget sets anticipated by individuals as they age. Similarly, income distribution studies should recognize that actual retirement income among retirees is determined to a significant degree by workers' retirement behavior. These considerations highlight the importance o f developing new data sets containing more complete information on workers, their earnings histories, and their com pany records, including pension system rules. In particular this chapter has shown that evaluating older individuals' incomes requires devising data sets quite different from those used by social scientists in the past. The observed differences in pension patterns also have an interesting policy implication. One proposal that has received some attention o f late in policy circles is the idea that the federal government should mandate pension benefit neutrality. This proposal is motivated by the belief that pension structures currently encourage early retirement. It is thought that mandatory pension neutrality would result in higher benefits for those continuing to work beyond age sixty, thereby encouraging longer work force commitment. However, our analysis shows that the actual result de pends on the benefit structure presently available to the covered employ ee. In pattern plans, the effect o f mandatory neutrality would probably be to cut early benefits rather than to increase later ones. Though this would affect retirement ages in the anticipated direction, retirement benefits would be lower than at present, not higher.
In conventional plans, on the other hand, mandatory neutrality could conceivably remove the desired incentives currently in place to defer re tirement; such a result would not be consistent with federal efforts to en courage later retirement. Altering pension reward structures currently in place could produce other undesirable results as well. If the current pen sion benefits patterns are structured in accordance with firms' perceptions o f the relative efficiency o f older workers compared to younger ones, im posing regulatory restrictions would be expected to increase firms' costs, some part o f which would probably be passed on to workers in the form o f lower wages or lower pension benefits. Both the welfare and the effi ciency costs o f mandating pension neutrality should be analyzed much more carefully before concluding that such a policy is desirable.
